
ARTICLES

Workfare in British Columbia: Social Development Alternatives

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The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of Carol Gamey and Jean Holder in preparing this document.

Abstract

This article demonstrates that in British Columbia workfare programs have not had discernible impact on the number of people receiving social assistance, and that the most powerful influence affecting the social assistance caseload is the number of jobs available. In the past, expenditures on workfare programs were politically appealing, particularly to right wing governments, as they responded to work ethic values and stigmatized those on welfare. However, a better informed public is now dubious of early claims of success and suspects that such programs can impose additional burdens on single parents and older workers. A social development strategy is a viable alternative. Many of the elements of such a strategy have been attempted in various jurisdictions including B.C. but what has been missing is a commitment to a social development approach which insists on combining labour market strategies with family policies and requires a reform of existing policy and management process to include public involvement and public reporting.

Residual Approaches and Social Development Alternatives

Introduction

The need for substantial reform of income assistance programs is evident. A number of recent reviews of these programs in Canada and other countries argue that they are now expected to fulfill responsibilities which were never intended when they were first established. Income assistance programs were developed on the confident assumption that full employment would prevail and that the basic family unit was composed of a father breadwinner, a mother homemaker and dependent children. Hence programs would be required to support only those few who could not work, who were temporarily

unemployed or who lived in single parent families. The confidence placed in these assumptions has been such that it has functioned as a sustaining ideology for policymakers even during the 1980s when unemployment rates were consistently high and the numbers of single parent families continued to increase rapidly. Policy makers have been aware of the shortcomings of income assistance policies but their commitment to a residual philosophy has limited their options for reform.

Residualists hold that state supported services should be provided only as a last resort when the resources of individuals, families, and churches and voluntary associations are exhausted. They also believe that government programs frequently rob individuals of their initiative to work and their commitment to family responsibilities. They favor two approaches to welfare reform and have tried both in the last two decades: firstly workfare, or "working for welfare" for employable persons and secondly increasing benefits to deserving poor such as the elderly. Although the consequence of this latter approach has been a marked decrease of the numbers of elderly persons living in poverty, conservative policy makers have been reluctant to extend this approach to other groups, fearing increased dependency, higher costs and a resulting loss of political support. Instead, they have defined a larger group of persons as "employable" and have extended workfare initiatives to this group.

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it describes the workfare programs in British Columbia over the past two decades and assesses the contributions these programs have made to welfare reform. The goals of residualist policy makers will be used to assess workfare success. Second, the authors examine why workfare programs have persisted in spite of their scanty record and suggest some reasons why it would be advantageous to policy makers of all political stripes to expand their roster of alternatives. Finally, policy alternatives based on a social development perspective will be proposed as an alternative approach to residualism. This perspective was selected because it has a growing currency amongst policy theorists but has been infrequently applied to specific and thorny policy problems.

In this paper the term workfare is used in a broad sense and refers to programs aimed at reducing the number of employable recipients of social assistance. As Rein notes such programs usually employ three approaches: restrictive strategies such as stringent eligibility requirements for governing eligibility for financial assistance; financial strategies such as earnings exemption policies, and service strategies such as information, job training and daycare (Rein, 1982a).

A fourth strategy, creating jobs for income assistance recipients is also included.

A Brief History of British Columbia Workfare Programs, 1969-89

The reemergence of workfare programs in B.C. in the 1970s fits with developments in other jurisdictions but also with the province's history of welfare policy. In the 1960s, workfare was implicit in three approaches to service delivery in B.C.: counselling and seasonal work projects, primarily for male recipients and stringent eligibility policies often aimed at female recipients. Counselling was directed towards assessing individual strengths, providing information and making referrals. Outcomes were difficult to measure although the numbers of cases closed each month for employable people was used as one indicator (Annual Report, 1965-1966:H37). Seasonal work projects were a mandatory rather than voluntary approach. Picking berries in the Fraser Valley or fruit in the Okanagan, firefighting and tree planting were typical jobs that employables receiving assistance had to accept in some areas during some seasons or be cut off welfare. Although the impact of many of these efforts was unrecorded, one of the authors recalls that her caseload activity would increase with individual appeals mostly regarding medical disability. Sometimes those employables who were mobile would relocate to another area without such restrictions to return when "the season" was over.

Women, particularly those with children, were not expected to join the paid labour force. However, "Man-in-the-House" policies served many of the same purposes of workfare programs. Female recipients of social assistance with employed boyfriends were expected to live with them and share their income or declare themselves a family unit and apply as such for social assistance if their man was unemployed. For women, "work for welfare" meant homemaking for an employed male. The end results of these policies were predictable. Women routinely hid any evidence of their personal lives from government workers who increasingly became investigators of behaviour rather than of financial needs and resources.

All of these approaches were complicated by the nature of employment in B.C. In primary industries such as forestry and fishing, employment was seasonal in nature and often required workers to relocate during high employment periods. Women and children were frequently left at home and without funds for lengthy periods. However, they were often ineligible for financial assistance unless they declared themselves separated from their absent

spouse. Moreover, families were often without income during seasons of high unemployment. Policies were ill equipped to deal with these realities, designed as they were primarily for people without work rather than for those in and out of the workforce.

The first formal workfare program, entitled "The Provincial Alliance of Businessmen" was introduced in 1969 by the colorful former minister of Highways, Phil Gaglardi, a longtime and powerful Social Credit Minister. Gaglardi made the following statement in announcing his program:

Today is the greatest day that ever we have had in our history for the individual. The individual with guts, with determination, with ability, with initiative—it is his day. We need individuals in political leadership today more than ever. Men with the guts to get up and say, "we're going to get the deadbeats off the welfare rolls, see. (*The Vancouver Sun* (September 10), 1970:6)

The program was founded on strong beliefs about individual initiative. Gaglardi believed unequivocally that poverty was an individual state of mind which could be improved through a combination of coercion and opportunity. The Alliance was to provide a structure for business people throughout the province to contact and employ those on welfare. In actuality, it was composed of a small group of ministry appointed employees (seven men, ten secretaries) with a relatively small budget (\$111,000 in the first seven months).

The political and policy characteristics of the program included strong connection with a new Minister, high expectations and wide publicity at inception, and close government control of policy development and implementation. Moreover, outcomes were unclear and never fully reported. As the press at the time reported:

Expectations were high when it started. In April of last year, Gaglardi said he should be able to take 20,000 to 30,000 people off welfare. By July, if fifty or a thousand were helped. "I think we will have done an outstanding job. (*The Vancouver Sun* (September 10), 1970:6)

The Alliance program was terminated with the election of the NDP in 1973. This government introduced an Incentive Program, which provided funds for work related expenditures for employable (and later unemployable) persons for volunteer work in business and non profit agencies. Participation was voluntary and although no formal evaluations were ever completed the program continues to this date.

These basic approaches to workfare continued with increasing vigor in the late seventies and eighties. In May 1976, shortly after assuming office as the new Minister of Human Resources, Bill Vander Zalm announced his "Provincial Rehabilitation and Employment Program" (PREP). He touted the merits

of the program which would provide work not welfare or, in his words, a shovel not a handout. PREP emphasized counselling and training for welfare recipients offered by newly hired government staff, provided some assistance for employment such as money for transportation and work clothes. In its later stages, PREP also offered a short term incentive to employers to hire recipients.

At the same time, the Minister introduced a new act, The Guaranteed Available Income for Need Act, (GAIN) which authorized the Minister "to set up a system of incentives, benefits and other programs for the purpose of encouraging recipients of income assistance to work or to gain skills" (GAIN, 1976, Section 10). A controversial and since rescinded policy identified certain geographical areas of the province as unsuitable for employable recipients. Other sections focused on increasing the incentives to work, such as maintaining health benefits for single parents who left GAIN rolls for work.

Again the benefits of PREP were extolled by government but no independent or comprehensive evaluations were conducted. As one editorial entitled "Confusing Figures" said:

At the end of January, Mr. Vander Zalm reported that so far PREP had found 3,750 jobs (or 4,465 working with Canada Manpower) in a program "barely five months old". Just after the middle of March, the minister said PREP had produced about 6,000 jobs in its first eight months. Now, in the middle of April, he says that more than 3,000 welfare recipients were placed in jobs in the first three months of this year, bringing the total to 7,474 since the initiation of the program in July. Given this time of inauguration of the full program, we still have at least the discrepancy between about 6,000 placements in eight months and about 7,500 in the same period. But that is not the only mystery. Missing from Mr. Vander Zalm's statistics are the number of job placements that have lasted a few days or a few weeks. We are not told how many of the 6,000 or 7,500 were still employed at the end of the first eight months, nor how many of the jobs "found" accounted for multiple placements. (*The Daily Colonist* (April 17), 1977:4)

Undaunted by this experience, in September 1980 the new Minister of Human Resources, Grace McCarthy announced her Individual Opportunities Plan (IOP). It was difficult to distinguish between this program and PREP as both emphasized improving the capacity of individual clients to be job ready. IOP included a specific program, Job Action, which was designed for recipients who had received GAIN more than three months. Participants received counselling and \$50 monthly to a maximum of \$150 for job related expenditures. And like PREP, the IOP included similar funding for education, training and assistance with employment related expenses but increased substantially the amount of money spent on these efforts. Soon after the IOP Plan was initiated, a controversial change in regulations defining employable recipients also occurred. For the first time single

parents were considered employable unless they had one child under six months or two children under twelve years. Affected families received a reduced allowance on the rationale that this would increase the incentive to find work.

Reviews of these efforts were conducted on an intermittent basis. In the first year of operation, 1980-1981 the Ministry reported that 273 of 337 clients or 81 percent found work while participating in the Job Action program. However, in 1984-1985 a survey found that 42.5 percent of participants found employment. The length of employment and a comparison with non participants was not included.

An increasing commitment to workfare programs continued with the appointment of Claude Richmond to the post of the now Ministry of Social Services and Housing in August 1986. Earlier that same year, B.C., represented by the Ministries of Human Resources and Labour, and the Federal government, represented by the Departments of Health and Welfare and Employment and Immigration, signed a bilateral agreement to implement a strategy to "Enhance the Employability of Social Assistance Recipients" (SAR). Terms of the agreement included moving welfare recipients into the federal training and employment programs (particularly the job development and job entry components of the Canadian Job Strategy); initiating provincial employment pilot projects funded by CAP; changing CAP guidelines so that some social assistance benefits could continue during the transition from welfare to work; and improving management and evaluation of programs and federal-provincial cooperation. It was explicitly agreed that increased efforts by one government to assist welfare recipients would not result in reduced efforts by the other. Furthermore, within the terms of GAIN and CAP, the participation of welfare recipients under this agreement was to be voluntary. It was also agreed that participants in such programs would be employable welfare recipients who had been on income assistance for at least eight months. The rationale was that such clients are likely to remain on welfare well beyond this period. It was estimated that 18,000 welfare clients in B.C. would benefit from initiatives funded under the agreement (Health and Welfare Canada, 1989:9.107). These efforts were supported by a diversion of CAP funds to Canadian Jobs Strategies and selected provincial programs (Prince and Rice, 1989). In the first three years of the agreement (1986-1987 to 1988-1989) Canada and B.C. made equal contributions of \$15 million. For 1990-1991 both governments are contributing \$28 million for a mutually agreeable package of employment related programs.

At the provincial level, a substantial portion of these new funds were used to develop a job creation program called JobTrac which provided incentives to employers to hire recipients and created new positions in forestry, tourism and the environment. Part of these efforts included the development of computer based inventories of client skills and the hiring of 115 rehabilitation specialists to carry out the new programs. JobTrac represented a departure from former programs in several ways. It emphasized job creation based upon a recognition of the importance of available employment in order to reduce income assistance rolls. It was a relatively well financed initiative well beyond the modest efforts of the past.

Like his predecessors, Richmond also increased pressure on employables by requiring that they must report for work or lose benefits and by changing the definition of unemployable single parents to those with one child under fifteen weeks or two children under six years. (After public protest this policy was rescinded to six months of age for one child as before but the six year limit for two children remained). Incentives such as modest improvements in earning exemptions and increased subsidies for transportation and day care for single parents were also part of the package.

In the 1986-1987 annual report, the Ministry reported that JobTrac had been successful with 2.2 million saved. A study of the FORSAR (JobTrac in the Forestry industry) concluded that:

The immediate benefits of FORSAR were a \$4.4 million savings in income assistance payments plus the performance of work valued at \$9.7 million. This offsets the \$12.9 million cost of the program by more than \$1.1 million. (38)

How the programs were evaluated or other details of the participants were not provided. In a comparative study of the Forestry JobTrac silviculture program, it was reported that clients hired under the program became independent of Income Assistance at a much faster rate than the comparison group, although no other details were provided (Employment Initiatives for Income Assistance Recipients, no date).

In spite of this seeming success, the JobTrac program was discontinued and reemerged under a new name "Employment Plus" in 1988-89. There was little difference between the two programs. The essential purpose, to provide wage subsidy for employers who hired income assistance recipients, remained the same. Although the forestry jobs were eliminated in Employment Plus, the tourism and environment focus continued. In fact this same job creation initiative has appeared under three different names in the space of a few years: Ministry of Labour/Ministry of Human Resources Joint Training Assistance Program, JobTrac and Employment Plus.

Characteristics of the British Columbia Approach to Workfare

Government Control of Policy Development and Assessment

The persistent development of a bewildering array of workfare programs developed and assessed solely by government is probably the most salient characteristic of B.C. programs. Although programs are announced as new initiatives, the announcement often obscures the fact that the program is mainly composed of existing initiatives. Government control of information about the outcomes has also persisted, increasing public cynicism about the whole enterprise. No comprehensive or independent studies documenting the effectiveness of workfare programs have ever been released to substantiate the press release claims to success. Moreover, the constant change in names makes tracking and evaluation of programs by outside researchers very difficult.

Government Control of Program Delivery

Hiring more government employees to administer the program has become a feature of each new initiative. With one exception, there has been no attempt to involve welfare recipients and self help networks in program delivery nor to build upon the informal employment systems upon which many recipients depend for job placement. The one exception to this, a pilot project designed to employ welfare recipients to assist others to find work, was cancelled despite a reportedly successful pilot project (Ministry of Social Services and Housing, *News Release* (April 17), 1976).

Short Term Results

Regardless of other claims (contributing to the economic development of the province, improving the skills of welfare recipients) the benefits of the program are consistently described in terms of numbers of persons who have been assisted to obtain employment. The time frames for assessment are short term with few if any comparisons with caseload turnover data or control groups.

Long Term Changes in Eligibility and Benefits

With the introduction of each "new" workfare program has come a substantial change in GAIN regulations which consistently defines a larger and larger circle of recipients as employable. In each case the effect of these regulations has been to reduce benefits and decrease recipients' security. These regulations remain on the books while the names and ground rules of workfare programs constantly change. It sometimes appears as if workfare programs have served as a cloak for new ministers to

introduce increasingly restrictive eligibility regulations.

The Confounding Issue of Eligibility and Employability

All workfare programs have confronted two thorny problems regarding eligibility and employability. First, they have tried to restrict eligibility to recipients of GAIN even though other unemployed persons may be excellent candidates for workfare programs. Thus, some unemployed people who are not in receipt of income assistance feel that their "welfare" counterparts enjoy extra advantages. Recently unemployed people in Victoria successfully challenged their exclusion from job finding services.

The second problem is deciding eligibility for workfare programs from within the recipient ranks. The decision to define women with small children and older workers as employable has been highly controversial and one from which the government has had in part to retreat. Without such an inclusive definition, however, workfare programs have little chance to demonstrate benefits. Single parents not only make up a substantial portion of the target group but they are often in receipt of benefits for a sufficiently long period to participate in workfare programs. Male recipients, particularly singles, are often in and out of the labour market and simply aren't around long enough to complete the program. Requiring them to enter the program could result in their being on income assistance longer than necessary.

These issues of eligibility and employability are controversial and slippery, and often the public debate on these matters has overshadowed the workfare programs themselves.

Mandatory Rather than Voluntary Participation

Under the terms of CAP, workfare programs are to be voluntary. However, government has a wide variety of strategies to ensure participation by recipients. These strategies include the emphasis on categorizing more persons as employable, tightening regulations on employable persons, reducing their benefits and hiring more staff to monitor job finding efforts of recipients. Incentives to work such as earnings exemptions and job allowances have been adopted much more sparingly.

Individual Rather than Structural Changes

Most of the B.C. workfare programs have directed efforts towards individuals and their job finding abilities. As the next section illustrates the merits of this approach during periods of high unemployment are questionable. The recent introduction of JobTrac represents a different approach and

focuses upon the creation of new jobs. Such programs appear promising for unemployed persons, and are discussed in the final section of the paper.

An Assessment of the British Columbia Program

In the above workfare programs, certain goals were announced at the outset to justify the introduction of the program:

- The percentage of persons in receipt of social assistance would decline.
- Recipients would receive benefits for shorter periods of time.
- The financial benefits of the program would exceed its costs.
- Although not announced explicitly, there is the implicit assumption that the political benefits exceed the potential drawbacks.

The evidence to support or challenge these goals has been assembled through annual reports and press coverage. There have been no published evaluations by government or other groups regarding these programs.

Percentage of People in Receipt of Social Assistance

The proportion of B.C. citizens receiving social assistance has risen markedly from 1.6 percent in 1967 to 4.6 percent in 1988. Interestingly enough, the proportion doubled from 2.2 percent in 1980 to 4.6 percent in 1988 in spite of vastly increasing expenditures on workfare during this period. This occurred during the time in which the unemployment rate itself doubled and then fell slightly (from 6.8 percent in 1980 to 14.7 percent in 1984 to 10.3 percent in 1988). Thus, the rise and fall in numbers of persons in receipt of assistance appears much more related to the unemployment rate than to the existence of workfare programs. This relationship is particularly apparent if the two groups which have been the targets for workfare programs are examined: single parents and singles (see Table B and C). In spite of considerable workfare activity in the eighties, the percentage of single parents and single persons receiving benefits through GAIN has closely followed the unemployment rate for these two groups.

The question can be asked if the percentage of recipients would have risen even higher without workfare programs? The evidence shows that the relationship between the welfare rate (the percentage of B.C. citizens on GAIN compared to the total population) and the unemployment rate (the percentage of unemployed citizens compared to all workers) has remained fairly consistent with or without workfare programs in the last two decades. From

Table A
Welfare and Unemployment
British Columbia, 1967-1987




Table B
Unemployment and Welfare
Single Parents






Table C
Unemployment and Welfare
Singles



1967 to 1979 the GAIN rate averaged 33 percent of the unemployment rate and from 1980 to 1988 during peak periods of workfare programs remained exactly the same. If the GAIN rate had risen higher during 1980-1988, this would have been out of step with the experience over the previous fifteen years. If it had fallen, workfare programs could have claimed some credit. But it remained the same. The unemployment rate appears to be the only consistent explanation for the numbers receiving social assistance regardless of the presence of workfare programs.

Another indicator of the effect of workfare programs can be determined by examining the GAIN caseload profile. Presumably if workfare programs had an effect on their target groups, these groups should become a smaller percentage of the total caseload compared to past years. This has not been the case. The percentage of singles and of single parents as a total of all recipients has actually increased over the past twenty years as Table D illustrates (see Table D on next page). Single parents changed from 22.6 percent in 1967 to 26.5 percent of all welfare recipients in 1988 while singles similarly increased from 55.1 percent to 60.7 percent in the same period.

Table D
Welfare Caseloads by Family Type
1967-1987



Turnover Rates

The B.C. government began to publish consistent data about turnover rates in 1982, about the same time unemployment was on the rise and workfare programs seriously underway. Turnover is defined as the percentage of cases closed after four months during a one year period. As Table E illustrates, the turnover rate has fallen over the 1981-1987 period and began to rise slightly again. At the same time, the unemployment rate has changed in an inverse pattern.

Table E
Turnover Rate of Recipients and Unemployment Rates in B.C. 1981-1986

	Turnover Rate	Unemployment Rate
1981-82	70%	6.7-12.1
1982-83	58.5%	12.1-13.8
1983-84	59.5%	13.8-14.7
1984-85	53.5%	14.7-14.1
1985-86	59%	14.1-12.5
1986-87	61%	12.5-11.9

Although the data are skimpy, it appears that the turnover rate is not apparently influenced by workfare programs as it decreased during their increased activity. Further tracking of the possible inverse relationship between turnover and unemployment is important.

Costs

Table F illustrates the rapidly rising costs of workfare programs in the last decade. Expenditures on different programs have varied: those on incentive allowances, the voluntary program for long term recipients, have declined and training and education expenditures have increased slowly (see Table H). The costs of Job Action and Assistance to Employment have increased more rapidly but remain a small portion of the expenditures. The most significant increase in the last two years has been the expenditures on job creation (see Table G). A tentative and ironic conclusion is that funds have been spent on preparing people for work when employment was not available, and creating jobs when the employment picture brightened.

Table F
Workfare Expenditures in British Columbia 1977-1987





Table G
Workfare Costs by Program Type



As noted above these expenditures appear to have had no effect on the overall numbers of persons receiving social assistance and on turnover rates. However, other benefits may have accrued: long term recipients may now have more opportunities and unskilled workers may now have training. These outcomes have not been documented. However, the development of various workfare programs for recipients alone may have been a more expensive and stigmatizing way of delivering those services than by increasing access for all through existing programs at community colleges and employment centres.

Political Benefits

The last three Ministers of Social Services and Housing have made much of their introduction of workfare programs (clearly expecting at least political benefits even if performance outcomes were not forthcoming). Getting tough on recipients through workfare has been viewed as a politically wise thing to do. It is difficult to assess whether political gains have occurred. Certainly, on one hand, the government could be seen by the public as taking appropriate action by policing malingerers and improving training and opportunities for the unfortunate. However, two actions have damaged these potential benefits. First, the press has questioned the outcomes of these programs and has been suspicious of current claims of success. Second, the targeting of single parents has produced some backlash. The public is increasingly aware of some of the problems of single parenting, particularly as these problems effect many more than single parents: affordable housing, minimal wage jobs, available daycare. Moreover, this pressure on single parents has occurred at the same time that the B.C. government has opposed access to abortion. The conundrum facing politicians is that, although single parents garner public sympathy, they are a required target for workfare programs given their percentage of the overall caseload and their

Table H Comparison of Social Development and Residual Approaches to Welfare Reform		
	<i>Social Development</i>	<i>Residual</i>
1. Control of Policy	Policy Commissions composed of Labour, Management, Province, Consumers, Professionals	Provincial Ministry
2. Control of Program	Community Cooperatives Community-controlled Agencies	Provincial Ministry
3. Objectives	Expanding Social and Economic Opportunities for the Poor	Improving Individual Capacity to Work
4. Strategies	Wide ranging including job creation, labour market measures, family policy measures, economic development	Counselling, Job Referral, Training Some Benefits
5. Time Frame	Medium to Long-term	Short-term
6. Eligibility	Emphasis on all low income, No mandatory requirement	Only welfare recipients are eligible but their participation is required
7. Information system	Open Commitment to evaluation	Closed No evaluation

relative stability in terms of program participation. Clear political benefits are less likely in present circumstances than in the past when government could target the single male.

A Social Development Alternative:

In spite of their pragmatic and political shortcomings, workfare programs will be difficult to dislodge. They serve the interests of many in leadership positions in welfare policy. For politicians, workfare appears to address two deeply held beliefs: that some people will not work unless pressed and that, given half a chance, some people will neglect their financial obligations to their family. Moreover, although they are also founded on two non existing conditions: full employment and nuclear families, there is a strong belief that somehow such programs will recreate these conditions. Further, the fact that most welfare policy makers are middle aged, middle class men who have often committed themselves to both work and family contributes to the longevity of workfare. These programs also have strong appeal to administrators and policy analysts. Their primary job, administering an efficient welfare payment system, has limited scope and is associated with heavy government spending on thinly supported causes. Workfare programs provide them with the oppor-

tunity to create innovative programs and receive praise.

Workfare programs also serve the interests of employers. They provide a ready pool of unskilled workers for short term work. Moreover, the salaries of these workers are often supplemented by government funds.

However, as noted above, the benefits to the clientele served by these programs and to the general public footing the bill are far less clear. Moreover, the public is weary of the simple equation that workfare will solve mighty social and economic problems. A final reason for the durability of workfare programs is the absence of policy alternatives. The last section of this paper will attempt to provide one such alternative based on a social development perspective. It has a clear advantage of demanding a change in focus to address the realities of single parent families and structural unemployment yet at the same time incorporating some of the most successful aspects of past workfare programs.

As its name implies, social development is an inclusive and comprehensive approach which is founded on the belief that social and economic well-being are interdependent, that people are motivated by opportunity rather than coercion and that participation and ownership by relevant groups in policy

and programs which affect them is essential. As Romanyshyn (1971) states:

Social development ... not only emphasizes the creation of social policies contributing to the "quality of life" for the people in a society, but goes beyond the welfare state to a concept of society committed to a continuing renewal of its institutions to promote the fullest development of man. (sic) ... It has come to be a counter-poise to a strategy of "pure" economic development, indicating a set of social goals as a basis for political and community action, in particular an improved social standard of living for the masses of people. It is equated with equality of opportunity and removal of poverty, or at least improvement in the condition of the poor... (380).

Although introduced into the literature some twenty years ago, social development is such a comprehensive approach that its implementation requires radical shifts in the administrative structures which have been established to manage social, health, economic and labour policy. It also requires the involvement of clients and community groups and for these reasons has not found favor with policy makers. Nevertheless we view inclusiveness as a positive feature because it contains the potential for dealing with old problems such as unemployment in a new and innovative fashion. In addition it should be noted that given its relative newness on the policy scene present definitions are far from complete or specific. The differences between the residual and social development perspectives related to welfare reform are shown in Table H.

The distinctive components of the social development approach can be grouped into three major categories:

- Reassignment of policy and program control (one and two of Table H),
- Broadened program objectives and strategies (three to six of Table H), and
- An open information system combined with a commitment to evaluation (seven of Table H).

Reassigning Control of Policy and Programs

In the workfare experience in B.C., government control of policy and service delivery has resulted in a narrow range of policy options, an expensive delivery system and a lack of ownership of the whole effort by those most affected: consumers, management and labour. Instead, B.C. could follow the example of other jurisdictions and form Social Development and Employment Commissions to guide policy in the future. In New Zealand, for example, as a result of a comprehensive review of the effects of racism on the structure and provisions of the Department of Social Welfare, the Maori Perspective Advisory Committee came to the conclusion that measures at many levels were required to ensure that non-racist and

culturally appropriate views would predominate. A new permanent body, the Social Welfare Commission, was established to advise the Minister on policy, consult with tribal representatives and oversee the administration of the department. The New Zealand Advisory Committee also recommended that specific women's representatives should serve on the Social Welfare Commission. Their representatives, who have been appointed, are in a position to identify sexism in policy making and administration and ensure the development of policy which is appropriate to the situation of women.

In B.C., the need for policy process restructuring is nowhere more apparent than in the area of Native involvement. Native peoples have the lowest rates of labour force participation of any social group, and the greatest degree of poverty. However, because of the location of many communities and because of low levels of education and job training, traditional workfare programs have been particularly inappropriate. Happily, Native peoples have not been targeted for traditional work incentive programs in the way that women have, probably because employers have not seen them as a plentiful source of low wage labour. The Ontario *Transitions* report argues that reform here has to begin from a position of respect for the First Nation objective of self-government.

The committee sees three steps necessary in enabling the native people to design and deliver culturally appropriate social assistance and related services. Throughout all these phases, including the drafting of legislation ... there must be ongoing consultation with native peoples. The three stages are short term reforms that do not require legislative change; new legislation specifically directed at native communities, giving them wide discretionary powers to design and deliver their own social assistance programs; and ultimately the transfer of legislative control over social programs to aboriginal governments (*Transitions*, 1988:83).

Another example of consumer participation, albeit on a smaller scale, comes from the Brotherhood of St. Lawrence in Melbourne, Australia. The family centered project was based on the assumption that people who live in poverty have no capacity to influence the significant social institutions which affect them. The project sought to change the condition of powerlessness by involving a group of randomly selected poor people in the management of the project.

At the commencement of the Project over half of the families had been in unsatisfactory or poor circumstances; by the end of 1973, one third were in good circumstances, one third in satisfactory circumstances and one third in unsatisfactory circumstances after a life-long history of deprivation and effective-

ness of welfare services in assisting disadvantaged families,

... the results described here offer considerable encouragement. Indeed for one third of the families to have achieved good circumstances after a life-long history of deprivation and welfare dependency would be considered by many working in the Welfare field to be nothing short of remarkable (Liffman, 1978:124).

A Broadened Range of Program Objectives and Strategies

Job creation and expansion strategies

The major problems of employable social assistance recipients as well as other unemployed and underemployed Canadians must be understood in relation to the problem of the lack of jobs. The first item on the agenda must therefore deal with the goal of full employment and the task of maximizing employment opportunities.

The Thomson Report reminds us that, "the federal government has the primary jurisdictional responsibility for employment" (*Transitions*, 1988:309). One area for clear leadership is a commitment to full employment. In the post-war welfare state there was an explicit commitment to high and stable levels of employment. This concept was culture bound in ways that we would not now accept (e.g., the concept of a working wage for the male "bread winner"), but it expressed a commitment to labour market structure and opportunity that we have lost. This is not true of all welfare states. The Canadian performance can be compared here with the Swedish one.

Successful attempts to maintain full employment have meant more not less government ... in the case of Sweden ... the annual budget deficit reached 13 percent of GNP, and government spending accounted for 67 percent of GNP, and spending on active labour market measures reached 2 percent of GNP. The result of such activity is that unemployment has not exceeded 3.5 percent in that country. Comparable figures for Canada in the early 1980s show federal deficits peaking at 6.9 percent of GNP; total government expenditures at 46.7 percent of GNP; and federal expenditures on training and job creation barely exceeding 0.5 percent of GNP. The unemployment rate reached 12 percent. (McBride, 8)

The social service sector also has a strong contribution to make to job creation. The Citizen Action organization in Hamilton provides a small scale example of such efforts. Over the past twenty years Citizen Action has placed ex-prisoners, patients released from mental hospital and a variety of other hard-to-place clients in employment. Citizen Action is controlled by a mix of former clients and radical professionals. It has not only been effective vis-à-vis clients but has secured a stable and diversified financial base.

Some organizations have combined social services and the development of independently operat-

ing enterprises. This includes both cooperative and profit types of business enterprise. Such enterprises lie outside the traditional field of social policy and derive their income from the market place. Little stigma apparently exists in this sector; indeed, the dominant values and rhetoric in our market society laud the independent entrepreneur.

Excellent examples exist of Indian bands which have developed enterprises that compete in the market place. In the Yukon the Champagne/Aishihik people operate a general contracting company competing for road and subdivision contracts. The Nuu-cha-nulth people operate a retreat and conference centre close to Pacific Rim National Park, and there are numerous examples of successful traditional, artistic and craft enterprises. Other examples of successful community economic cooperatives are reported in the Canadian Council on Social Development publication, *New Age Business*. Successful community cooperatives exhibit the following features:

- (a) their basic goal is community development and improvement through the use of economic resources; (b) rather than being one-shot affairs, they are attempts to develop an enabling structure to serve the local community on a long-term basis; (c) they wish to be autonomous and self-sustaining; and (d) most of all, they are local, self-help movements based upon the history and traditions of particular groups of people (McLeod, 1986:55).

A 1987 publication of SPARC of B.C. identifies fifty community economic development projects which have been established in B.C. Most have been formed in the past ten years and represent a community-based response to the lack of employment generated by industry and the public sector (Social Planning and Research Council, 1987).

If the Report of the Advisory Council on Adjustment can be taken as an indication, the private sector is now recognizing that it too has a significant responsibility for job creation. In the Council's view, Canadians have placed too much responsibility on governments; responsibility that should be borne in large part by the private sector. In considering the issues raised in this report, the Council wishes to emphasize that it is the private sector that must take on most of the costs of training and retraining its work force. It has neglected this responsibility in the past and now must make it part of any corporate plan (Government of Canada, 1989:138).

Work place reform strategies

Work place inequalities have particularly acted to the detriment of women who have been largely employed in low wage, routine service and clerical positions. In this view discrimination against women in employment practices and settings is the problem. Measures to combat the problem include positive

employment policies towards women and "equal pay for work of equal value" policies. Actions under the labour code and through human and civil rights legislation are key parts of this strategy.

Examples of pay equity policies are to be found in several provinces including Manitoba, Quebec and Ontario. The Ontario *Pay Equity Act* is a recent example of such legislation. The Act came into effect January 1st, 1989, and provides major Ontario employers with a year to develop a pay equity plan and five years to bring the plan into effect. Plans use established position rating techniques to compare the responsibilities, knowledge, skills, stress, and other factors of positions regardless of the predominant gender of the holders. Positions found to have similar ratings are then required to have similar salaries, rather than having salaries set by the market place and by external comparison to similar positions.

Family policy strategies

There is a close relationship between policies for families, for employment, and for income security. The marginal employment situation of women is compounded by the fact that women are the unpaid caregivers for children and for dependent seniors. A well rounded group of basic family support policies and programs would include:

- affordable quality day care
- family allowances
- housing allowances
- maintenance collection measures, and
- transitional supplements for sole support mothers.

The family continues to be the principal resource for the developmentally and physically disabled, the mentally ill, the older dependent senior and, today, aids sufferers. It is necessary to recognize the value to the community of these support and caring roles since it is both an affront to logic and efficiency to provide incentives and to coerce women into low-wage employment while having to replace the caring functions of the family with professional services.

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